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Russian Energy and Climate Policy 
Remains Inconsistent – Challenges 
for the EU
Christian von Hirschhausen, Claudia Kemfert and Franziska Holz
The relations between Russia and the EU with respect to energy and cli-
mate policies have been characterized in recent months by two phenomena.
On the one hand, the EU has to deal with questions regarding the security
of energy supply. The Russian government's high-handed treatment of
domestic and foreign energy enterprises operating in the country is irritat-
ing potential investors. There is reason to seriously doubt that genuine
progress is being made with market economy reforms in the Russian energy
sector. While Russia will remain an important energy supplier for Germany
and the EU in the medium term, the importance of other crude oil and natu-
ral gas exporters, including some North African countries, is likely to grow.
On the other hand, it can be noted positively that Russia (in response to
intense pressure from the EU) has ratified the Kyoto Protocol on reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions, enabling the protocol to enter into force in
February 2005. But Russia is expected to withhold emissions permits for
strategic reasons, i.e. in order to allow the price of CO2 certificates to rise.
The value of the CO2 emissions permits allocated to Russia under the Kyoto
Protocol could earn the country a revenue of up to 30 billion euro. However,
whether this will actually happen will also depend on the National Alloca-
tion Plans of the EU member states.
Energy production in Russia and energy exports to 
the EU
In a context of high world market prices for energy, the Russian energy
industry is still the primary pillar of economic growth in the country. Fol-
lowing a decline in primary energy production in the 1990s, output has now
stabilized again and in some cases is actually rising (cf. table 1). Russia has
consolidated its position in recent years as a strategic exporter of energy.
Not only Europe but also the United States and China are becoming increas-
ingly important importers of Russian energy sources.
Russian crude oil output has been growing since many years. With
external sales amounting to almost 200 million tonnes (2003), Russia is the
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second-largest exporter (after Saudi Arabia) of crude oil
in the world. Russia is also an important supplier of
crude oil to the EU-15. Imports from the former Soviet
Union accounted for around 25% of total EU imports in
2003 (cf. table 2). The accession of the countries of east-
ern Europe to the EU has further strengthened Russia's
position, given that most of the new members from east-
ern Europe traditionally have ties with Russia. Many
observers expect that Russia's share of European crude
oil imports will continue to expand in the future.1 In
actual fact, this would only be possible if substantial
augmentations to the transport infrastructure are real-
ized, because most of the existing facilities (cf. figure 1)
are already being used to full capacity. 
Russia's output of just under 600 billion m³ makes it
the world's largest producer of natural gas. And given
its proven reserves of 47 000 million m³, Russia is also
the country with by far the most natural gas in the
world (around 27% of world reserves).2 The country's
importance for the EU with respect to natural gas has
also increased. EU imports from Russia accounted for
almost one-third of total imports in 2003; and this figure
was even higher for Germany (44%).
Russian coal production has stabilized at a high
level. However, given the relatively bad quality of the
coal deposits and the high transport costs, the export
potential for coal is negligible. The same applies to the
Russian electricity sector at present. The very limited
transmission capacities between Russia and the EU as
1  Cf., for example, European Commission: 'Green Paper: Towards a
European strategy for the security of energy supply.' Brussels 2002.
Table 1
Primary Energy Production in Russia, 1990 to 2003
Brown coal Black coal Crude oil Natural gas Hydro-electric power Nuclear power
Million tonnes Billion m³ Billion kWh
1990 137.3 257.4 516.2 640.5 166.8 118.3
1995 101.0 161.0 307.0 595.0 99.5 99.5
2000 95.0 161.0 323.4 583.6 131.0 131.0
2001 98.0 171.0 348.1 581.2 137.0 137.0
2002 93.0 160.0 379.0 593.0 142.0 142.0
2003 98.5 184.4 420.7 617.8 135.9 150.4
Sources: BP: Statistical Review 2004; IEA Coal Information 2004; DIW Berlin calculations.
Table 2
European Mineral Oil and Natural Gas Imports, 1999 to 2003, by Country of Origin
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mineral oil (million tonnes)1
Former Soviet Union 87.5 98.1 110.3 135.8 154.2
Other countries 460.4 467.7 456.7 423.4 480.9
Total 547.9 565.8 567.0 559.2 635.1
Natural gas (billion m³)2
Russia 108.8 112.6 108.8 104.7 111.2
Other countries 159.5 172.4 183.2 210.6 238.5
Total 268.2 285.0 292.0 315.3 349.6
1 EU-15. — 2 EU-25.
Sources: IEA Natural Gas Information 2003 and 2004; IEA Monthly Oil Market Report, December 2004; DIW Berlin calculations.
2  Cf.: 'BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004.'DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 11/2005  129
well as high transport costs mean there will be virtually
no electricity exports in this direction in the medium
term. In these circumstances, there seems to be little jus-
tification for fears that European electricity suppliers
could decide to invest in Russian power plants and
deliver electricity to Europe from there.
Russian energy policy opts for 
nationalization
The energy policy pursued by the Russian government
has been characterized in recent years by a steady
increase in state influence. The break-up of the Yukos
oil company and the subsequent integration of its oil
unit into the state-controlled firm Gazprom alarmed
many observers _ especially foreign investors. The
transfer of ownership of the Rosneft state oil company
to Gazprom provides further evidence of the Russian
government's desire to strengthen its influence in the
energy sector. In addition, the government is planning
to introduce a law that will prohibit enterprises with
majority foreign ownership from extracting resources in
Russia. The government's long-term objective seems to
be building up and controlling a large, state energy firm
(natural gas and oil) which will dominate the market.
The fact that the Russian energy policy is unpredict-
able complicates relations with foreign firms and inves-
tors. In order to modernize its production capacities and
pipelines, Russia needs investments of up to US $ 1000
billion for the next 25 years.3 The attempts made to date
by the European Union to increase the transparency of
Russian energy policy, for example within the frame-
work of technical assistance programs, and to create a
positive investment climate have not been very success-
ful. Likewise, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue has so far
Source: DIW Berlin.
Figure 1
Russian Natural Gas and Crude Oil Export Pipelines to Europe
DIW Berlin 2005
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produced little more than political statements.4 Russia
has still not signed the Energy Charter Treaty, which
was adopted over ten years ago to promote the develop-
ment of the infrastructure between eastern and western
Europe.5 In light of the growing importance of the Rus-
sian energy sector, the step backward with respect to
market economy reforms must be viewed critically.6
Prospects for European natural gas 
imports – new import sources
Many forecasts predict that Russia's importance with
respect to EU imports of natural gas will increase.7 The
high growth in the EU countries of demand for natural
gas (an environmentally friendly energy source), cou-
pled with the decline in domestic output, leads observers
to expect an increase in the share of imports originating
from Russia to between 50% and 67%. The authors of
the EU Green Paper on supply security, as well as some
member states, view such dependency on Russian natu-
ral gas exports with some unease, and are therefore call-
ing for greater diversification. Norway, for example,
which has enough reserves for the next few decades, is
considered a reliable trading partner. There are abun-
dant and low-cost natural gas reserves in North Africa
(Algeria, Libya, Egypt), too.8 The existing pipelines
through the Mediterranean Sea (Transmed, Medigaz)
are currently being extended and additional transport
links are planned (originating in Libya, for example).
Moreover, one of the consequences of the rapidly
advancing globalization of the natural gas markets is
that it renders possible supply of liquefied natural gas
(LNG) from more distant regions.9 Thus, countries in the
4  Also cf. http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/russia/overview/
index_en.htm.
5  Cf. www.encharter.org.
6  Cf. Hella Engerer: 'Russische Energiewirtschaft: Hohe Exporterlöse
verschleiern Reformbedarf.' In: Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin, no. 15/
2003. Also cf. the special issue of Osteuropa  journal: 'Europa unter
Spannung _ Energiepolitik zwischen Ost und West', vol. 54, issue 9-10,
2004.
7  Cf., for example, European Commission: 'Green Paper ...', loc. cit.
The GASMOD model
DIW Berlin is currently developing a numerical simulation
model of the European natural gas market named GASMOD.
GASMOD represents natural gas flows to Europe and trade
between European countries in two successive stages. In the
model, gas-producing countries export it to individual EU
countries. For simplification, it is assumed that exactly one
natural gas enterprise operates in each country that trades
gas. The demand behavior of the importers is characterized
by a constant price elasticity of demand. The model is based
on the idea of non-linear profit maximization on the part of
the enterprises ('players'). GASMOD calculates the trade
flows and the wholesale market prices under the assumption
of certain competitive conditions.
The following exporting countries and regions are considered
in the model: Russia, Norway, Great Britain, Netherlands,
Algeria, Middle East, Libya, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Trin-
idad, and Venezuela. Within Europe, there are the following
importing countries: Germany, Austria, France, Spain/Portu-
gal, Belgium/Luxembourg, Italy/Switzerland, Great Britain,
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden/Finland, Poland, Czech
Republic/Slovakia/Hungary, Romania/Bulgaria, Baltic States,
former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece.
GASMOD takes into account the current or predicted produc-
tion costs of the exporting countries. In addition, transport
costs to the EU border are included.1 Under competitive con-
ditions, it is above all the supplier's cost situation that deter-
mines the result. The objective function of the natural gas
exporters is their profits. Based on the input data, the result-
ing prices and flows of natural gas are calculated by the pro-
gram using non-linear optimization. Two scenarios are simu-
lated with respect to the behavior of the exporters:
–  In the Oligopoly scenario, the exporters act strategically
and exert market power, i.e. they are able to add a mark-
up on the marginal cost price (Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium).
–  In the Competition scenario, by contrast, all natural gas
exporters are price takers. In this case, prices and quan-
tities are calculated in accordance with the assumptions
of full competition.
Another important characteristic is the specific problem for
this market of the available transport capacities. Natural gas
is transported over long distances either by pipeline or in
liquefied form (LNG) in tankers. Both pipeline and liquefac-
tion/gasification capacities are limited, and GASMOD identi-
fies potential capacity bottlenecks.
1  The data sources used are official EU statistics as well as recent
studies, for example Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie:
'Assessment of Internal and External Gas Supply Options for the EU.
Executive Summary.' Sophia-Antipolis 2002; F. van Oostvoorn (ed.):
'Long-term gas supply security in an enlarged Europe: Final Report
ENGAGED Project.' Energy research Centre of the Netherlands
(ECN), Amsterdam 2003. Transport costs are partly estimated.
Box 
8  Observatoire Méditerranéen de l'Energie: 'Assessment of Internal
and External Gas Supply Options for the EU. Executive Summary.'
Sophia-Antipolis 2002.
9  Transport by pipeline is cheaper for distances of up to around
3000 kilometers, while tanker transport in the form of LNG is cheaper
over longer distances.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 11/2005  131
Middle East (Iran and Qatar, in particular), but also
Nigeria, Trinidad, and Venezuela, are expanding their
export capacities, while numerous import terminals for
LNG are being constructed in Europe.
DIW Berlin has developed a model of the European
natural gas market (cf. box) to simulate different market
scenarios and analyze the importance of Russia and of
the other exporting countries for the European market.
The point of departure for the scenarios is the cost struc-
ture of the exporting countries examined. Russia
remains an important supplier of natural gas to Europe
in both presented scenarios, but its significance declines
in comparison to the current situation. Russia's market
share would fall from 32% today to less than 30% (cf.
table 3). Amongst the other suppliers, in particular Alge-
ria's low production costs could lead to an increase in its
share of the European natural gas market from around
16% to 25% in the oligopolistic scenario.10 Dutch
exports could also benefit from comparatively low pro-
duction and transport costs and expand the Nether-
lands' market share. Norway would decline in impor-
tance in an oligopolistic market structure as a result of
its high production costs.11 Because the production and
transport costs for LNG are assumed to be relatively
high, few producers from overseas are present on the
European market in the simulation scenarios. However,
given the dramatic fall in transport costs of LNG, the
competitiveness of LNG suppliers is rapidly increasing.
Therefore, a substantial shift in EU imports from pipe-
line gas to LNG can be expected in the medium term.
The gas market will thus become increasingly similar to
the oil market.
Existing transport capacities prove to be a con-
straint in both scenarios. This applies especially to sup-
plies from the North African low-cost countries. How-
ever, in the medium term, Russia's export pipelines will
not suffice either to cover demand. The construction of a
direct pipeline through the Baltic Sea from St. Peters- 10  This result coincides with the findings of another study on the out-
come of more intense competition on the European natural gas market.
Cf. Ferdinand Pavel et al.: 'Is the Ukrainian-Russian Gas Consortium
in the Economic Interest of Ukraine? Lessons from a European Gas
Model'. Report prepared for the German Advisory Group to the Gov-
ernment of Ukraine. Berlin and Kiev 2003.
Table 3




market share in %
Competition Oligopoly
Exports in bcm1 Market share in % Exports in bcm1 Market share in %
Algeria 110.0 22.9 110.0 24.8 13.5
Libya 3.6 0.8 3.6 0.8 0.2
Egypt 28.6 6.0 28.6 6.4 0.0
Iraq 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iran 15.2 3.2 15.2 3.4 0.0
Middle East 0.0 0.0 9.9 2.2 0.7
Former Soviet Union 140.4 29.3 124.6 28.1 26.6
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.7 2.4
Trinidad 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0
Venezuela 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total non-European countries 297.8 62.1 295.2 66.6 43.4
Netherlands 105.7 22.0 105.7 23.9 15.9
Great Britain 26.4 5.5 26.4 6.0 23.4
Norway 49.5 10.3 15.7 3.6 17.3
Total 479.3 100.0 443.0 100.0 100.0
1 bcm (billion cubic meters) = billion m³.
Sources: IEA Natural Gas Information 2004; DIW Berlin calculations.
11  It must be emphasized here that so-called 'soft' criteria for market
decisions, e.g. the reliability of a supplier, are not represented in the
model.132 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 11/2005
burg to Greifswald in Germany is therefore under dis-
cussion (cf. figure 1). The more likely solution, however,
will be the expansion of the transit pipeline system
through Ukraine, despite the associated political risks.12
Will Russia benefit from emissions 
trading?
Russia also plays a strategic role within the emissions
trading system of the Kyoto Protocol. Human induced
greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change.13 Rus-
sia is the fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases in
the world after the USA, China, and Europe.14 Under the
Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997, the industri-
alized countries have committed themselves to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions.
Following Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol
last November, the Protocol is now binding law for
those countries that are listed in Annex I of the Frame-
work Convention and have actually ratified the agree-
ment (e.g. Russia, Europe, Japan, Australia, and Can-
ada). The Russian ratification also means that the Proto-
col's 'flexible' mechanisms, which include emissions
trading, will be fully operative from 2008 onward. A
pilot project to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the
period 2005 to 2007 on the basis of a European emis-
sions permit system was already launched in Europe on
1 January 2005.15
In 2002, the USA decided not to ratify the Kyoto Pro-
tocol because of feared high economic losses. Further-
more, the USA insist that developing countries such as
China, which is already the world's second-largest emit-
ter of greenhouse gases, should also commit to binding
greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Figures 2 and 3 show the trends for CO2 and total
greenhouse gas emissions in Russia from 1990 to 2012.
Emissions fell sharply between 1990 and 1994 as a
result of the economic downturn in Russia.16 The fore-
cast drawn up in the Third National Communication of
the Russian Federation on future CO2 emissions is based
on different assumptions. The reference scenario
assumes a strong economic growth (5.2% per annum)
and also high consumption of resources, which causes a
sharp rise in emissions. The optimistic scenario assumes
that the use of innovative technology will result in a
reduction of energy intensity. The probable scenario is
based on the assumption of moderate rates of economic
growth (3.3% per annum), so that emissions will rise
less strongly than in the reference scenario.
Potential Russian earnings of 30 billion 
euro from emissions trading
Under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, within the com-
mitment period 2008 to 2012, the Annex I countries are
bound to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to
below their 1990 level.17 Under the emissions trading
12  Cf. Christian von Hirschhausen, Berit Meinhart, and Ferdinand
Pavel: 'Transporting Russian Gas to Europe _ A Simulation Analysis.'
In: Energy Journal, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 49-68.
13  Cf. Claudia Kemfert: 'The Economic Costs of Climate Change.' In:
DIW Berlin Weekly Report, no. 2/2005.
14  Cf. Hans-Joachim Ziesing: 'Worldwide climate protection policy _
still no visible success.' In: DIW Economic Bulletin, vol. 41, no. 10,
October 2004.
Figure 2
CO2 Emissions in Russia, 1990 to 2012
In million tonnes of CO2 equivalents
Sources: Third National Communication; Interagency Commission of the Russian
Federation on Climate Change Problems, Moscow 2002.
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15  In Germany, the emissions certificates were allocated in February
2005; trading was to officially open on 28 February 2005.
16  Past emissions trends are summarized in the Third National Com-
munication of the Russian Federation. Cf. Interagency Commission of
the Russian Federation on Climate Change Problems: 'Third National
Communication of the Russian Federation.' Moscow 2002. Also cf.
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/rusnce3.pdf, data from 11 Febru-
ary 2005, p. 17.
17  Under the Kyoto Protocol, Russia has committed itself to stabilizing
its emissions at the 1990 level.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 11/2005  133
system, Russia will be able to sell whatever amount of
greenhouse gases emitted in the period 2008 to 2012 that
lies below the 1990 emission level. Even if the Russian
economy and Russian energy consumption are expected
to experience a relatively robust growth, emissions in
the years 2008 to 2012 are unlikely to exceed those of the
base year 1990 significantly. In the event of the probable
scenario realizing, under the emissions trading system,
Russia could sell up to nearly 1300 million tonnes of CO2
equivalents and thereby earn a significant revenue. If
Russia were to participate in emissions trading, the
country could realize accumulated earnings of up to
30 billion euro in the period 2008 to 2012 (cf. figure 4).18
Unlike the USA, for whom _ according to the model
simulations carried out to date _ the economic incentives
to rejoin the climate agreement are minimal,19 Russia
will benefit substantially from the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. Under moderate assumptions about
Russian economic growth and energy consumption
(probable and optimistic scenarios), and at an emission
permit price of 20 euro per tonne of CO2 equivalents,
Russia could earn accumulated revenue of between 23
and 30 billion euro. In the event of strong economic
growth and high energy consumption, the country could
earn a maximum of 8.7 billion euro. The reason is that
strong economic growth along with the associated high
level of energy consumption would cause emissions to
rise in Russia and almost reach the 1990 level. The level
of the emission permit price will depend essentially on
the quantity of emissions certificates demanded by both
Europe and Japan. On the European emissions trading
market, which opened at the beginning of 2005, the allo-
cation of emissions permits via the National Allocation
Plans for the first trading period 2005 to 2007 has
resulted in an initial price of around 8 euro per tonne of
18  Cf. Claudia Kemfert: 'International Climate Coalitions and Trade _
Assessment of Cooperation Incentives by Issue Linkage.' In: Energy
Policy, vol. 32, no. 4, 2004, pp. 455-465; Erik F. Haites, Farhana Yamin,
Odile Blanchard, and Claudia Kemfert: 'Implementing the Kyoto Pro-
tocol without Russia.' In: Climate Policy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 143-152.
Figure 3
Trend for Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 
Russia, 1990 to 2012
In million tonnes CO2 equivalents per annum
DIW Berlin 2005
Sources: Third National Communication; Interagency Commission of the Russian














19  Cf. Claudia Kemfert, Erik F. Haites, and Fanny Missfeldt: 'Can
Kyoto Protocol Parties Induce the United States to Adopt a More Strin-
gent Greenhouse Gas Emissions Target?' In: Interdisciplinary Environ-
mental Review, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003, pp. 119-141.
Figure 4
Russian Revenue from Trading in Emissions 
Certificates
In billion euro at respective certificate price
Sources: DIW Berlin calculations.
DIW Berlin 2005
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CO2. However, even in the event of a low price for emis-
sions permits, Russia could still realize earnings through
the sale of emissions permits. In addition, it is conceiv-
able that Russia will strategically withhold its emissions
permits in order to drive up the price.
Conclusion
Russia is an important but difficult partner for the EU
with respect to energy and climate policy. It remains a
major guarantor of Europe's energy supply security.
However, other energy suppliers, especially those from
North Africa, also have good prospects, of expanding
their market shares. Russia's ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol represented an important step forward with
respect to climate policy. Nevertheless it is very difficult
to predict how Russia will behave with regard to emis-
sions trading. The quantity of emissions permits sold by
Russia will depend not only on the strategic behavior of
the Russian Federation, but also on the level of demand
from the EU.